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“VIRTUAL CERTAINTY” IN A DIGITAL 
WORLD: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S 
APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH 
DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL STORAGE DEVICES 
IN UNITED STATES v. LICHTENBERGER 
Abstract: In 2015 in United States v. Lichtenberger, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that police violated the Fourth Amendment by 
exceeding the scope of a private search of computer files. This decision devi-
ated from holdings of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, which held that under the private search doctrine, police could more 
thoroughly search digital devices that were previously searched by a private 
party. The Sixth Circuit created a circuit split by failing to apply the closed 
container approach to the digital storage devices in Lichtenberger. This Com-
ment argues that the closed container approach should not be applied to 
searches of digital devices under the private search doctrine. This Comment 
also argues that the Sixth Circuit correctly adopted the “virtual certainty” test 
of scope, but failed to properly apply the test to the facts in Lichtenberger. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this age of smartphones and cloud computing, courts have struggled 
to apply Fourth Amendment protections to searches of electronic devices.1 
Digital evidence has become an important tool for law enforcement agen-
cies in the investigation and prosecution of crime.2 The nature of these elec-
tronic devices, however, raises significant concerns regarding personal pri-
vacy rights.3 
 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 532–33 
(2005) (noting the “tentative and often contradictory” lower court opinions regarding personal 
computers and Fourth Amendment rights); Emma Raviv, Note, Homing In: Technology’s Place in 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 593–94 (2015) (noting that tech-
nological advancements have complicated Fourth Amendment doctrines). 
 2 See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 112, 112–14 (2011) (noting common use of computer forensic examiners in criminal 
investigations); Kerr, supra note 1, at 532 (stating that computer searches have become an im-
portant step in many criminal investigations). 
 3 See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 164 (comparing computer searches to home searches and 
noting the significant threat computer searches pose to personal privacy). 
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In 2015, in United States v. Lichtenberger, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether a police search of 
laptop files exceeded the scope of a prior search by a private party.4 In rul-
ing that the evidence of child pornography found on Lichtenberger’s laptop 
was properly suppressed, the Sixth Circuit applied the private search doc-
trine, which states that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to 
searches by private parties.5 Under this doctrine, police can conduct a war-
rantless follow-up search as long as it does not exceed the scope of the ini-
tial private search.6 An after-occurring police search exceeds the scope of 
the private search if the police are not virtually certain that nothing else of 
significance will be discovered.7 This “virtual certainty” test was articulated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984 in United States v. Jacobsen.8 
In Lichtenberger, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the child pornography 
found on Lichtenberger’s computer must be suppressed because the police 
officer had no “virtual certainty” as to what he would discover.9 By holding 
that police exceed the scope of a private search by looking at additional 
files on a digital device, the Sixth Circuit deviated from holdings of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuit.10 In doing so, the Sixth 
                                                                                                                           
 4 United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger II), 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 5 Id. at 488–89. 
 6 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–17 (1984) (stating that the government 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment by using information revealed by a third-party source); 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (noting that the government can conduct a war-
rantless search if it does not exceed the scope of the private search). 
 7 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488; see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (applying a virtual certain-
ty test of scope to a police search of a package containing cocaine). 
 8 466 U.S. at 119. In 1984 in United States v. Jacobsen, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a 
field test did not exceed the scope of a preceding private search of a FedEx package. Id. In Jacob-
sen, a FedEx employee discovered a white powdery substance when examining a damaged pack-
age. Id. at 111. A Drug Enforcement Administration Officer performed a field test and identified 
the substance as cocaine. Id. The Court found that there was “virtual certainty” that the field test 
would reveal nothing else of significance. Id. at 119. 
 9 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490. 
 10 Compare id. (holding that police exceeded the scope of the private search by possibly view-
ing more files than the private searchers), with United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the police did not exceed the scope of the private search by viewing addi-
tion files on CDs), and Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (adopting the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in Runyan). In 2001 in United States v. Runyan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit analogized digital storage devices to closed containers and held that once a pri-
vate party searches a device, the police do not exceed the scope of the prior search by more thor-
oughly searching the same device. 275 F.3d at 464. Under this closed container analysis, a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in “opaque containers that conceal their contents from 
plain view.” United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1992). Once a private party 
has opened the container, however, the owner’s privacy has been compromised. Runyan, 275 F.3d 
at 465. Therefore, any after-occurring governmental search of the container’s contents falls within 
the scope of the initial search. Id. at 464–65. 
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Circuit implicitly created a circuit split with potentially far reaching impli-
cations on personal privacy and law enforcement.11 
This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit correctly articulated the 
“virtual certainty” test of scope but failed to correctly apply the test to the 
police search of a laptop computer in Lichtenberger.12 Part I of this Comment 
reviews the current state of the Fourth Amendment private search doctrine 
and its application to digital storage devices.13 Part I also provides the factual 
and procedural background of Lichtenberger.14 Part II contrasts the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning in Lichtenberger with the closed container analysis employed 
by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Runyan in 2001.15 Part III argues that 
the closed container approach used by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits should 
not apply to digital storage devices.16 Part III also argues that the Sixth Cir-
cuit was correct to apply the “virtual certainty” test of scope, but failed to 
properly evaluate the test in light of the specific facts in Lichtenberger.17 
I. THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE  
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
The dawn of the digital age brought with it a diverse range of new 
Fourth Amendment applications.18 Courts have been forced to consider the 
unique privacy interests posed by electronic devices such as computers and 
smartphones.19 Section A of this Part examines the history of Fourth 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for Comput-
ers, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/ [https://
perma.cc/LWD5-Q7L4] (noting that although the Sixth Circuit cites the Fifth and Seventh Circuit 
cases in support of the decision in Lichtenberger, the Sixth Circuit’s decision differs materially 
from the holdings of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits); see also Katie Matejka, Note, United States 
v. Lichtenberger: The Sixth Circuit Improperly Narrowed the Private Search Doctrine of the 
Fourth Amendment in a Case of Child Pornography on a Digital Device, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
177, 191–93 (2015) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit erred by declining to follow the reasoning used 
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in Runyan and Rann). 
 12 See infra notes 101–125 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 23–51 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 52–67 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 68–100 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 113–125 and accompanying text. 
 18 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014) (addressing the constitutionality 
of a police search of cell phone data after arrest); United States v. Jones, 123 S. Ct. 945, 948 
(2012) (examining whether Global Positioning System attached to defendant’s Jeep violated the 
Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (analyzing whether thermal-
imaging device used to scan exterior of private home violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment in case 
involving eavesdropping device placed on outside of public phone booth). 
 19 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing the immense storage capacity of cell phones and 
the diverse range of information contained therein); Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 485–87 (apply-
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Amendment jurisprudence and the development of the private search doc-
trine.20 Section A also discusses the applicability of the private search doc-
trine to digital storage devices.21 Section B reviews the facts and procedural 
posture of United States v. Lichtenberger.22 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Private Search Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment protects the American people from unreason-
able searches of their “person, houses, papers and effects.”23 To qualify as a 
Fourth Amendment search, the intrusion must violate a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.24 In determining whether a Fourth Amendment 
search is unreasonable, courts first turn to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.25 Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasona-
ble on their face; however, there are some limited exceptions.26 Generally, 
when determining whether to exempt a search from the warrant require-
ment, courts balance the individual’s privacy with the government’s interest 
in gathering evidence.27 In order to deter unreasonable, and thereby unlaw-
ful, police searches, courts have turned to the exclusionary rule, which pro-
hibits the admission of evidence that is obtained as a result of an unlawful 
search.28 
                                                                                                                           
ing the private search doctrine to police search of a laptop); Rann, 689 F.3d at 838 (applying the 
private search doctrine to police search of a zip drive and a camera memory card). 
 20 See infra notes 23–42 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 52–67 and accompanying text. 
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 (holding that search did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because it “infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy”). 
 25 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
 26 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”); see, e.g., Washington v. 
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1982) (applying the plain view exception to police search of a dorm 
room); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (articulating the search incident to 
arrest exception: it is reasonable for a police officer to search a person being arrested in order to 
remove weapons or evidence that may be within the person’s reach); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (establishing the motor vehicle exception, which allows police to search a 
vehicle as long as they have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband will be found). 
 27 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (“[W]e generally determine whether to exempt a given type of 
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it in-
trudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 
(1999))). 
 28 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in searches 
and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in both federal and state courts). 
The exclusionary rule was not created to deter police misconduct, but in modern times deterrence 
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These Fourth Amendment protections, however, only apply to gov-
ernmental action.29 An unreasonable search or seizure conducted by a pri-
vate individual is not subject to the exclusionary rule unless the individual 
who conducted the search was acting under the direction of a government 
official.30 Under the private search doctrine, when a person’s privacy has 
been violated by a private party’s search, the government is not prohibited 
from using the information discovered from that search.31 The private 
search doctrine also allows a government official to conduct a warrantless 
follow-up search within the scope of the initial search.32 The government’s 
follow-up search only violates the Fourth Amendment when it exceeds the 
scope of the initial private search.33 
In Jacobsen, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to determine whether 
the government’s search exceeded the scope of the initial private search, 
courts must balance the amount of information the government stands to gain 
and the level of certainty regarding what they will find.34 The government’s 
search is within the scope of the initial search if the officer is virtually certain 
that nothing new will be discovered.35 Courts applying the “virtual certainty” 
test of scope have focused on the nature of the area being searched.36 For ex-
                                                                                                                           
has become the primary rationale for use of the rule. See Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A 
More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary 
Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 53 (2010) (noting that deterring police misconduct was not an 
original justification for the creation of the exclusionary rule). The exclusionary rule disincentiv-
izes unlawful searches by police by prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained during an 
unlawful search in a criminal trial. Id. (noting the development of the theory that the exclusionary 
rule deters police misconduct by removing the incentive to disregard the Fourth Amendment). 
 29 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (quoting Walter, 447 U.S. at 662) (stating that Fourth Amend-
ment protections only apply to government searches and seizures); Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 
482 (quoting Jacobsen, 446 U.S. at 113–14) (stating that Fourth Amendment only protects against 
government action). 
 30 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (quoting Walter, 447 U.S. at 662) (explaining that Fourth 
Amendment protections do not apply to unreasonable searches by a private individual); Lichten-
berger II, 786 F.3d at 482 (quoting Jacobsen, 446 U.S. at 113–14) (stating that searches by agents 
of the government are still subject to Fourth Amendment protections). 
 31 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117; Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 482; Runyan, 275 F.3d at 457. 
 32 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115; Walter, 447 U.S. at 657. 
 33 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115–17 (stating that the government does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by using information revealed by a third party); Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 (stating that 
the government cannot exceed the scope of a private search unless an independent search is justi-
fied). 
 34 466 U.S. at 119. 
 35 See id. (stating that the government did not infringe on an individual’s privacy rights be-
cause there was a “virtual certainty” that reexamining the package searched by the private party 
would reveal nothing new of significance); Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (explaining that to 
remain within the scope of the private search, police had to have “virtual certainty” that the fol-
low-up search would reveal nothing new). 
 36 See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to extend the pri-
vate search doctrine to a search of a motel room); United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1436 
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ample, in 1997, in United States v. Allen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit declined to extend the private search doctrine to the search of a 
motel room.37 The court distinguished its holding from Jacobsen by noting 
the material differences between the search of a residence and the search of a 
mail package.38 Some courts have applied a “closed container” analysis to 
private search doctrine cases.39 Under this analysis, a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in “opaque containers that conceal their contents from 
plain view.”40 Once the container has been opened by a private party, the 
owner’s expectation of privacy in the container’s contents has been frustrat-
ed.41 Therefore, any after-occurring governmental search of the container’s 
contents falls within the scope of the initial search.42 
The “virtual certainty” test to determine whether a governmental 
search exceeded the scope of a prior private search has been complicated by 
technological advances.43 In particular, courts have been forced to grapple 
with the application of the private search doctrine to searches of digital 
storage devices.44 For example, in United States v. Runyan, in 2001, the 
Fifth Circuit considered the application of the private search doctrine to a 
police search of CDs and zip disks.45 When the police conducted the fol-
                                                                                                                           
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that search of a closed camera lens exceeded the scope of the prior 
search). 
 37 See Allen, 106 F.3d at 699 (noting the differences between personal residences and smaller 
containers). 
 38 See id. (stating that the entire contents of a mail package are obvious when opened, whereas 
a motel room contains personal possessions that were not all viewed during the private search). 
 39 See Rann, 689 F.3d at 837 (adopting the container analysis for police search of a memory 
card and zip drive); Runyan, 275 F.3d at 458 (accepting the conceded fact that CDs and zip disks 
were containers for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 40 Villarreal, 963 F.2d at 773. 
 41 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (stating that a person can no longer have an expectation of privacy 
in the contents of a container that has been opened and searched by a private party); see Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. at 119 (noting that because the package was unsealed and searched by the private party, 
the respondents had no privacy interest in the package’s contents). 
 42 See Rann, 689 F.3d at 837 (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Runyan); Runyan, 275 
F.3d at 464 (holding that police do not exceed the prior private search when they examine a closed 
container more thoroughly than the private party). 
 43 See Marc Palumbo, Note, How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 977, 999–1000 (2009) (noting that the container 
approach used in Runyan is problematic given the unique characteristics of electronic storage 
devices). Compare Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 487 (noting the unique qualities of electronic 
devices in applying the “virtual certainty” test), with Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464 (using the container 
approach to hold that police did not exceed the scope of a private search of CDs). 
 44 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 487 (noting the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. 
California when articulating the specific privacy concerns posed by digital storage devices); 
Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65 (applying the private search doctrine to CDs and zip disks); see also 
Palumbo, supra note 43, at 999 (arguing that the closed container approach should not be applied 
to digital storage devices). 
 45 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 456. 
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low-up search, they examined CDs that were previously viewed by the de-
fendant’s ex-wife and opened files on zip disks that were not previously 
viewed by the defendant’s ex-wife.46 
When considering whether the police search exceeded the scope of the 
private search, the Fifth Circuit asked whether the police were certain that 
nothing new would be discovered during the follow-up search.47 The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that police exceeded the scope of the prior private search 
by examining zip disks that were not opened during the initial search.48 Po-
lice did not exceed the scope of the prior private search, however, when 
they viewed more files on the CDs than the private searcher.49 The Seventh 
Circuit adopted the same approach in Rann v. Atchison in 2012.50 In Rann, 
the Seventh Circuit held that a more thorough search of a digital device did 
not exceed the scope of the private search because the officer was certain 
that the devices contained child pornography.51 
B. Factual and Procedural History of United States v. Lichtenberger 
In 2015, in United States v. Lichtenberger, the Sixth Circuit, relying on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, held that po-
lice exceeded the scope of a preceding private search by examining files that 
may or may not have been viewed during the initial search.52 On November 
26, 2011, Aron Lichtenberger was with his girlfriend, Karley Holmes, at a 
home they shared with Holmes’s mother.53 Two of Holmes’s mother’s friends 
came to the house and told Holmes’s mother that Lichtenberger had previous-
ly been convicted of child pornography offenses.54 The police were called, 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 454. 
 47 See id. at 463 (considering whether the police were “substantially certain” that their search 
would uncover nothing new). Although the “substantial certainty” language differs slightly from 
the “virtual certainty” test applied by other circuits, it has the same meaning. See Lichtenberger II, 
786 F.3d at 489 (using the phrases “substantial certainty” and “virtual certainty” interchangeably 
when comparing the decision to Runyan); see also John T. Burnett, The Enigma of Workers’ 
Compensation Immunity: A Call to the Legislature for a Statutorily Defined Intentional Tort Ex-
ception, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 500 (2001) (noting that “substantially certain” and “virtually 
certain” were interchangeable standards in Florida tort law). 
 48 275 F.3d at 464. 
 49 See id. (reasoning that the CDs were “containers” under the Fourth Amendment, and there-
fore the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the CDs once they 
were opened and searched by the private party). 
 50 689 F.3d at 837. 
 51 Id. at 838. The Seventh Circuit adopted the “substantial certainty” language used in Runyan 
instead of the “virtual certainty” language used in Jacobsen. Id. at 837. 
 52 786 F.3d at 490–91. 
 53 United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger I), 19 F. Supp. 3d 753, 754 (N.D. Ohio 
2014) (noting that the residence in Cridersville, Ohio was owned by Holmes’s mother), aff’d, 786 
F.3d 478. 
 54 Id. 
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and Lichtenberger was arrested for failing to register as a sex offender.55 Later 
that day, Holmes hacked into Lichtenberger’s laptop using a password recov-
ery program.56 She eventually found a folder containing child pornography.57 
After showing her mother, the two found several more sexually-explicit im-
ages involving minors on Lichtenberger’s laptop.58 Holmes closed the laptop 
and called the police.59 
When Officer Huston arrived at the house in response to Holmes’s call, 
Holmes explained to him why she had searched Lichtenberger’s laptop.60 
Officer Huston asked Holmes to show him what she had found, so she 
opened the laptop and began clicking through random images of child por-
nography.61 Officer Huston retrieved Lichtenberger’s other electronics and 
left the home with the evidence.62 
In the subsequent criminal proceedings for possession and distribution 
of child pornography, Lichtenberger moved to suppress all of the evidence 
found on his laptop computer.63 The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio suppressed the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule.64 
The court found that the private search doctrine applied, but ruled that 
Holmes was acting as an agent of the government during the follow-up 
search, therefore, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.65 The gov-
ernment filed a timely appeal of the evidentiary ruling to the Sixth Circuit.66 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. Holmes requested that police escort Lichtenberger off of the property, but upon discov-
ering an active warrant for his arrest for failing to register as a sex offender, Officer Huston arrest-
ed Lichtenberger. Id. 
 56 Id. Holmes testified at the suppression hearing that she hacked Lichtenberger’s laptop be-
cause Lichtenberger had acted strangely whenever she was near the computer and she wanted to 
know why. Id. 
 57 Id. Holmes noted that she accessed a folder labeled “private” that contained numbered sub-
folders. Id. When she clicked on one of those folders, it came up with thumbnail images of child 
pornography. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481 n.1. 
 58 Lichtenberger I, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 755. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. Holmes explained that the laptop belonged to Lichtenberger and that he was the only 
one who would use it. Id. She also noted that she tried to use the laptop once, but Lichtenberger 
got upset and told her to stay away from it. Id. 
 61 Id.; see Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (noting that Holmes admitted during testimony 
that she could not recall if the photos she showed Officer Huston were the same images she had 
seen during her previous search). 
 62 Lichtenberger I, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 755. 
 63 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481. Lichtenberger was indicted on December 5, 2012, and 
moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the laptop on November 26, 2011. Id. 
 64 See Lichtenberger I, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 759. 
 65 See id. at 758–59 (holding that the initial search by Holmes was a private action, but that 
the follow-up search by Officer Huston constituted government action and thus required a war-
rant); see also infra note 87 (explaining that the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis 
because a warrantless government search can permissibly follow a private search as long as it does 
not exceed the scope of the initial search). 
 66 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 480. 
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court on different 
grounds, and the case was dismissed on remand.67 
II. CLOSED CONTAINERS OR “VIRTUAL CERTAINTY”: TWO APPROACHES TO 
APPLYING THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE TO  
DIGITAL STORAGE DEVICES 
In United States v. Runyan in 2001 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit ruled that police did not exceed the scope of a prior search by 
examining more files on a CD than the private searchers.68 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion when ana-
lyzing a similar search of a digital device in United States v. Lichtenberger 
in 2015.69 This Part examines the approaches used by both courts that led to 
this circuit split.70 
In Runyan, the Fifth Circuit analogized zip disks and CDs to closed 
containers and held that police did not exceed the scope of a private search 
by examining more files on a digital storage device than the original search-
ers.71 In 2000, Robert Runyan was convicted on four counts related to child 
pornography.72 Following his conviction, Runyan filed an appeal in the 
Fifth Circuit arguing that evidence obtained during a police search should 
have been suppressed as the search that violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.73 In remanding the case for further fact-finding the Fifth Circuit split 
its analysis into two separate categories of evidence.74 
The court first considered disks that were never accessed by Runyan’s 
ex-wife but which were turned over to police with other evidence of child 
pornography.75 The Fifth Circuit applied a “substantial certainty” test, a func-
tional equivalent of the “virtual certainty” test, and held that the police ex-
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 491, remanded to No. 3:12-cr-00570-JGC (N.D. Ohio dismissed July 9, 2015). 
 68 United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 69 See United States v. Lichtenberger (Lichtenberger II), 786 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that police exceed the scope of the prior search by examining more files in a folder than 
the private searcher). 
 70 See infra notes 71–100 and accompanying text. 
 71 275 F.3d at 464. The government conceded that electronic disks were closed containers for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 458. The Fifth Circuit did not rule on this point but accepted 
the characterization as it was uncontested. Id. 
 72 Id. at 455. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 460–65 (applying the private search doctrine to the zip disks that were not accessed 
by the ex-wife, prior to applying the doctrine to the CDs which were accessed by the ex-wife). 
 75 See id. at 460 (addressing Runyan’s argument that police exceeded the scope of the prior 
search by examining more disks than the private searches, before determining whether police 
erred by examining more files on disks which were opened by the private searchers). The private 
searchers only examined some of the CDs and floppy disks that they discovered. Id. The private 
searchers did not have the equipment required to open or read the contents of the zip disks. Id. at 
464. 
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ceeded the scope of the prior search by examining disks that were not 
opened by the private searchers.76 The court noted that the disks were not 
labeled, and the private searchers testified that they did not know the con-
tents of the disks they had not opened.77 The fact that the disks were found 
in the same location as other evidence of child pornography was not enough 
to make police substantially certain as to the contents of the disks.78 
The Fifth Circuit next considered Runyan’s argument that the police 
exceeded the scope of the initial search by examining more files on the CDs 
than the private searchers.79 The Fifth Circuit noted that individuals possess 
an expectation of privacy in closed containers.80 Once a container is 
opened, however, the expectation of privacy is frustrated.81 Therefore, when 
private searchers open a closed container, police do not exceed the scope of 
the prior search by more thoroughly examining the container’s contents.82 
The Fifth Circuit in Runyan equated CDs and zip disks to closed containers, 
and held that police do not exceed the scope of a prior search when they 
view more files on a digital device than the private searchers.83 
The Sixth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Lichtenberger, 
holding that Officer Huston exceeded the scope of the prior search because 
he viewed files that may have differed from those viewed by the private 
party.84 The Sixth Circuit first considered whether the private search doc-
trine was applicable.85 The court found that the critical elements, a private 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id.; cf. Burnett, supra note 47, at 500 (noting that “substantially certain” and “virtually 
certain” were interchangeable standards in Florida tort law). 
 77 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464. 
 78 Id. Police could not be sure that the unopened and unlabeled disks contained child pornog-
raphy. Id. 
 79 Id. The Fifth Circuit notes that it is not clear if police examined more files than the private 
searchers because the officer only looked at two or three images on each disk. Id. The court de-
termined that, even if more files were examined, the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. 
 80 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464 (citing Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 542 (1990)). 
 81 See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (stating that a person’s expectation of privacy in a container is 
compromised once it is opened and searched by a private party). 
 82 See id. (holding that police do not conduct a new Fourth Amendment search each time they 
find a particular item if the container was previously opened and examined during the private 
search); Matejka, supra note 11, at 193 (arguing that the folder viewed in Lichtenberger is analo-
gous to a closed container, and if it was opened by the private searcher, then the after-occurring 
police search is within the scope of the prior search). 
 83 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65. 
 84 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 489–91. The Sixth Circuit noted the Fifth Circuit’s similar 
focus on “virtual certainty,” but the court also characterized the approach in Runyan as being 
broad. Id. at 489. The Sixth Circuit discussed the “container analysis” in Runyan, but did not ex-
plicitly support or reject it. Id.; see also Matejka, supra note 11, at 193 (noting that if the Sixth 
Circuit had adopted the container approach of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, Officer Huston’s 
search would have been within the scope of the private search). 
 85 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 484. 
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search and an after-occurring police search, were satisfied.86 Having deter-
mined that the private search doctrine applied, the Sixth Circuit analyzed 
the scope of Officer Huston’s search in relation to Holmes’s private search.87 
Given the testimony that the files viewed by Officer Huston may have dif-
fered from those viewed in the private search, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that Officer Huston had no “virtual certainty” as to what he would discover.88 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the “virtual certainty” test also was used 
by the Fifth Circuit in Runyan; however, the Fifth Circuit came to the oppo-
site conclusion regarding files that were not examined by the private 
searcher.89 This discrepancy is explained by the Fifth Circuit’s use of the 
closed container analysis.90 The Fifth Circuit only applied the “virtual cer-
tainty” test to the disks that were not opened by Runyan’s ex-wife.91 Using 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. Lichtenberger argued that the private search doctrine should not apply to laptops. Id. at 
483. He cited the Sixth Circuit’s 1997 holding in United States v. Allen, which declined to extend 
the private search doctrine to searches of motel rooms. Id. at 483; United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 
695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997). Lichtenberger argued that laptops contain information similar to that 
found in a home, or temporary abode, and therefore Allen should apply. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d 
at 484. The Sixth Circuit declined to extend the special protections afforded to homes to laptops 
stating that “[h]omes are uniquely protected space under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citing 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)). 
 87 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 485. The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s analysis 
that Holmes was acting as an agent of the government during the follow-up search and thus the 
search was impermissible. Id. Agency is only relevant to Holmes’s initial search, as a governmen-
tal search can permissibly follow a private search. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 119–20 (1984). 
 88 Id. at 488. Holmes testified that she could not be sure if the photos she showed Officer 
Huston were the same as the images she had seen earlier as the folders contained hundreds of 
pictures. Id. 
 89 Id. at 489 (noting that other circuit courts similarly used a “virtual certainty” test when 
applying the private search doctrine to searches of contemporary electronic devices). Compare id. 
at 491 (holding that Officer Huston exceeded the scope of the private search by possibly viewing 
files that had not been viewed in the private search), with Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–65 (holding 
that police did not exceed the scope of the private search by examining more files on CDs than the 
private searchers). 
 90 See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–65 (applying a “substantial certainty” test of scope to disks 
that had not been opened by the private searchers but relying on a container approach in place of 
the “substantial certainty” test when evaluating the police search of more files on disks that were 
opened during the private search); see also Matejka, supra note 11, at 193 (noting that if the Sixth 
Circuit had adopted the container approach of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, Officer Huston’s 
search would have been within the scope of the private search). The Fifth Circuit’s use of the 
container approach precluded the application of the “virtual certainty” test for all digital devices 
that had been opened by the private searchers. Id. The court stated that once a container was 
opened by the private party, police could more thoroughly search that container. Id. at 464. There-
fore, police did not exceed the scope of the private search by viewing additional files in the con-
tainer than the private searchers. Id. at 465. 
 91 Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65. The Fifth Circuit used the “substantial certainty” test to eval-
uate the scope of the police search of disks that were not accessed by the private searchers, but 
there is no mention of the term during the court’s analysis of the disks that were examined during 
the private search. Id. 
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the container analysis, the Fifth Circuit determined that Runyan did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the disks that had been opened 
by his ex-wife.92 Therefore, the court did not apply a “virtual certainty” test 
to the CDs that were previously opened.93 
The Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the container approach used by the 
Fifth Circuit, and instead focused on the unique privacy concerns posed by 
digital storage devices.94 The Sixth Circuit echoed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Riley v. California, in 2014.95 In Riley, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the immense storage capacity of cell phones and computers, not-
ing that these devices can contain a digital record of a person’s personal and 
professional life.96 Given the qualities of electronic devices, the Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded that the files viewed by Officer Huston could have been pho-
tos of Lichtenberger, his bank records, or his medical history; the possibili-
ties were endless.97 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lichtenberger implicitly 
created a circuit split with the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.98 The Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits employed a closed container analysis; whereas the Sixth 
Circuit, focused on the unique qualities of digital devices, applied the “vir-
tual certainty” test of scope.99 The effects of this split are made clear when 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See id. (stating that once a container is opened and searched by a private party, the owner’s 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container is compromised). 
 93 Id. The Fifth Circuit held that once a container is opened by a private party, the police do 
not exceed the scope of that prior search by examining more of the contents of the container. Id. at 
465. Therefore, there was no reason to apply a “substantial certainty” test. See id. 
 94 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (citing the district court’s finding that a laptop is not 
comparable to a physical container given the amount of information that a laptop can contain). 
The Sixth Circuit discussed the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California, which 
focused on the unique privacy concerns posed by electronic devices. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2489 (2014); Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488. 
 95 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 487–88. In Riley, the Supreme Court, focusing on the signifi-
cant privacy interests at stake, held that police must obtain a warrant before searching a cellphone 
seized incident to arrest. See 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
 96 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. In Riley, the defendant was stopped for driving with an expired 
registration and a suspended license. Id. at 2480. A search of the car revealed two concealed 
handguns, and the defendant was arrested and searched. Id. Police seized the defendant’s cell 
phone and searched its contents for evidence of gang activity. Id. 
 97 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 489. 
 98 See Kerr, supra note 11 (noting that the Sixth Circuit considered individual files whereas 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits analogized digital devices to Fourth Amendment containers). Com-
pare Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 491 (holding that Officer Huston exceeded the scope of the 
private search by possibly viewing files that had not been viewed in the private search), with 
Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463–65 (holding that police did not exceed the scope of the private search by 
examining more files on CDs than the private searchers). 
 99 Compare Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (noting that an individual’s expectation of privacy in a 
container is compromised when it is opened and searched by a private party, and, therefore, the 
police do not exceed the scope of the search by examining more of the contents of the container), 
with Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490 (holding that Officer Huston’s lack of “virtual certainty” 
was dispositive). 
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looking at the outcomes of the two cases: in Runyan, the evidence from po-
lice searches of disks viewed by the ex-wife were ruled admissible, and af-
ter being remanded to the district court, three of the convictions were up-
held on a subsequent appeal, but in Lichtenberger, the evidence was sup-
pressed and the case was dismissed on remand.100  
III. CLOSING THE DOOR ON THE CONTAINER APPROACH: APPLYING THE 
PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL DEVICES 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. 
Lichtenberger in 2015 correctly abandoned the closed container approach 
used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2001 in United 
States v. Runyan.101 The Sixth Circuit erred, however, in its application of 
the “virtual certainty” test to the facts of the case.102 This Part argues that 
the closed container analysis used by the Fifth Circuit, and adopted by the 
Seventh Circuit in Rann v. Atchison in 2010, should not apply to digital 
storage devices.103 This Part also argues that the Sixth Circuit articulated the 
correct test of scope, but failed to properly apply the test to the facts in 
Lichtenberger.104 
The closed container approach to digital devices could result in signif-
icant violations of personal privacy, and therefore should not be adopted in 
future cases.105 In, United States v. Jacobsen in 1984, The U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Compare Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, appeal after remand, 290 F.3d 223, 252 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming three of four convictions on a subsequent appeal after the case was remanded to the 
district court for further fact finding), with Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 491 (all charges were 
dismissed after remand to district court), remanded to No. 3:12-cr-00570-JGC (N.D. Ohio dis-
missed July 9, 2015). 
 101 See Kerr, supra note 11 (arguing that the Sixth Circuit approach is correct as the container 
approach would lead to inconsistent and concerning results). Compare United States v. Lichten-
berger (Lichtenberger II), 786 F.3d 478, 490 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding Officer Huston’s lack of 
“virtual certainty” dispositive in determining that his search exceeded the scope of the prior pri-
vate search), with United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that police 
did not exceed the scope of the private search by examining more items in a container than the 
private searchers). 
 102 See Matejka, supra note 11, at 196 (arguing that because Holmes knew that the majority of 
the images in the folder were child pornography, the “virtual certainty” test was satisfied); cf. 
United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that because the private searcher 
could identity the contents of the photos from the thumbnail images, police enlargement of the 
photos was irrelevant). In United States v. Lichtenberger in 2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit stated that the files viewed by Officer Huston could have been bank statements or 
medical records. Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 489. This was incorrect because the thumbnails 
were smaller images of child pornography and clicking on them merely enlarged the images. Id. at 
480. 
 103 See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 113–125 and accompanying text. 
 105 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488 (citing the district court’s finding that the search of a 
laptop is highly intrusive given the amount of data it can hold, and therefore the laptop is not 
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Court noted that in follow-up searches of physical containers, the risk to per-
sonal privacy is that the private searcher did not notice, or remember seeing, a 
particular object.106 In the case of digital devices, which can hold vast 
amounts of information, the private searcher would have to click on every 
individual file to see all of the disk’s contents.107 Therefore, in follow-up 
searches of digital storage devices, the privacy risks are greatly increased.108 
The Sixth Circuit highlighted these risks in Lichtenberger, explaining 
that digital devices can contain bank statements, medical records, personal 
correspondences, and a range of other material not discovered by the private 
searcher.109 In Runyan, the police had no virtual certainty that the follow-up 
search of the CDs would reveal nothing else of significance.110 The CDs 
accessed by the ex-wife could have contained tax forms or investment in-
formation in addition to child pornography.111 The Fifth Circuit’s use of the 
closed container approach, however, precluded the application of a “virtual 
certainty” test of scope, and violated Runyan’s personal privacy rights.112 
                                                                                                                           
comparable to a physical container); Kerr, supra note 1, at 555–56 (arguing that the physical con-
tainer approach used in Runyan would lead to disturbing results given the amount of private in-
formation a digital device can contain); Palumbo, supra note 43, at 1000 (noting that network disk 
drives can contain information from a large group of individuals and that the closed container 
approach would mean that if one user’s data was legally searched, then police could search other 
individuals’ data stored on the same drive). 
 106 See 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984) (stating that the defendant’s privacy is not further infringed 
if the government is simply avoiding the risk of false testimony or faulty memory from the private 
searcher and noting that the Officer’s inspection of the package simply protected against the risk 
of misdescription). 
 107 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 489 (stating that the files viewed by Officer Huston 
could have been anything). 
 108 See id. (noting that police could have discovered a range of private information unrelated 
to child pornography); see also Palumbo, supra note 43, at 1000 (suggesting that the search of a 
business man’s computer in connection to financial fraud could reveal his wife’s personal data 
stored on the same computer); cf. William Clark, Note, Protecting the Privacies of Digital Life: 
Riley v. California, the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement, and Search Protocols for 
Cell Phone Search Warrants, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1981, 2008 (2015) (noting the unique threat to the 
“privacies of life” posed by searches of cell phones). 
 109 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 489. 
 110 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 488–89 (noting that the “virtual certainty” test was not 
satisfied because there was a possibility that Officer Huston may have opened files that had not 
been examined by the private searcher); Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464 (noting that it was not clear 
whether police had viewed files that were the same or different than those viewed by the private 
searchers). 
 111 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 487–88 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2489 (2014)) (noting the different types of documents which could also be stored on a digital 
storage device); see also Palumbo, supra note 43, at 1000 (suggesting that the search of a business 
man’s computer in connection to financial fraud could reveal his wife’s personal data stored on 
the same computer). 
 112 See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464–65 (applying the container analysis instead of a “virtual 
certainty” test of scope when evaluating the police search of disks that were opened during the 
prior private search); Palumbo, supra note 43, at 999–1000 (arguing that the closed container 
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The Sixth Circuit correctly adopted the “virtual certainty” test of scope, 
but the court incorrectly applied the test given the specific facts of Lichten-
berger, which show that Officer Huston was virtually certain that nothing else 
of significance would be revealed by his follow-up search.113 The Sixth Cir-
cuit reasoned that because files cannot be viewed prior to clicking on them, 
the police officer could not have been virtually certain of what he was to 
discover.114 
 The court failed to consider, however, that the files at issue in Lichten-
berger were displayed as thumbnails, smaller versions of the file’s images.115 
The Sixth Circuit states that Officer Huston could have discovered documents 
such as bank statements, medical records, internet search histories, and per-
sonal communications among the photographs.116 This was not the case, 
however, as the files Holmes discovered in her private search were displayed 
as thumbnail images, and thus they could not have been text-based docu-
ments.117 Therefore, there was no risk of revealing other documents like those 
suggested by the court.118 Holmes was not sure if she showed Officer Huston 
the same images that she had previously viewed, but there was little risk that 
the few files shown to Officer Huston would reveal anything else of signifi-
cance other than images of child pornography.119 
                                                                                                                           
approach would lead to exposure of a vast amount of private information). Contra Matejka, supra 
note 11, at 194 (arguing that the Sixth Circuit should have followed the persuasive authority of the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Runyan and Rann). 
 113 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 490 (noting that Officer Huston’s lack of virtual certain-
ty was dispositive); id. at 481 (noting Holmes’s testimony that she had viewed approximately one 
hundred photos of child pornography and Officer Huston’s statement that he was shown four or 
five photographs). 
 114 See id. at 489 (noting that the main folder was labeled “private” and the sub-folders were 
labeled with numbers, therefore Officer Huston could not have been sure if the files contained 
pornography or unrelated images or documents). 
 115 See id. (stating that police could have discovered text-based documents such as bank 
statements and medical records). Holmes stated that she clicked on the sub-folders, which re-
vealed images of child pornography displayed as thumbnails. Id. Clicking on specific thumbnails 
revealed larger versions of the images. Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. at 480 (noting Holmes’s testimony that she found “thumbnails [sic] images of 
adults engaging in sexual acts with minors”); see also Tosti, 733 F.3d at 822 (noting that the pri-
vate searcher and the detectives testified that a person could identify the photos as child pornogra-
phy from the thumbnail images). 
 118 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 480 (noting Holmes’s testimony that she found “thumb-
nails [sic] images of adults engaging in sexual acts with minors”). Holmes testified that she could 
tell the photos contained child pornography from the thumbnail images. Id.; see also Tosti, 733 
F.3d at 822 (noting testimony that the thumbnail images could be identified as child pornography 
without clicking on them). In United States v. Tosti in 2013 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that police did not exceed the scope of a private search by viewing enlarged 
thumbnails of child pornography. 733 F.3d at 825. 
 119 See Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481 (noting Holmes’s testimony that the thumbnail im-
ages showed child pornography). Holmes testified that she clicked roughly one hundred images of 
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This understanding of the “virtual certainty” test emphasizes the key 
factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Jacobsen: the amount of infor-
mation the government stands to gain, and the level of certainty regarding 
what they will find.120 Here, Officer Huston was just confirming Holmes’s 
testimony by viewing four or five images.121 He did not search the entire 
computer or all of the contents of the folders.122 As such, the government 
could have gained little information from the follow-up search.123 Further-
more, Holmes’s extensive private search of approximately one hundred 
photos of child pornography, and the fact that all the files were clearly im-
ages, made it “virtually certain” that the few images viewed by Officer Hus-
ton would also contain child pornography.124 As Officer Huston’s search did 
not exceed the scope of Holmes’s prior search, the Sixth Circuit should 
have reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for trial.125 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lichtenberger represents a necessary 
return to the fundamentals of the private search doctrine envisioned by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Jacobsen. The closed container analysis used by the 
Fifth Circuit in Runyan, and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Rann, fails to 
fully account for the unique attributes of electronic storage devices. This 
application of the container approach opened the door for violations of pri-
vacy that far exceeded the limits envisioned by the Supreme Court when 
crafting the private search doctrine. In Lichtenberger, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
child pornography saved in a folder labeled “private,” and it contained sub-folders labeled 2-12. 
Id. She later showed Officer Huston approximately four or five of the pictures in the folder. Id.; 
see also Matejka, supra note 11, at 196 (arguing that because Holmes had identified so many 
images in the folder as child pornography, the Sixth Circuit should have ruled that the “virtual 
certainty” test was satisfied). 
 120 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119–20 (holding that the government search did not exceed the 
scope of the private search because the advantage gained by the government was merely avoiding 
a flaw in the private party’s recollection and that there was a “virtual certainty” that nothing else 
of significance would be found). 
 121 Lichtenberger II, 786 F.3d at 481. After seeing a few images of the child pornography, 
Office Huston asked Holmes to shut down the computer, and he called his supervisor for further 
instructions. Id. at 480. 
 122 Id. at 481. 
 123 See id. at 480–81 (noting Holmes testimony that the files in the sub-folder were displayed 
as thumbnail images). Given the thumbnail images, there was no danger that Officer Huston 
would see any documents other than pictures. Id. Furthermore, Officer Huston only viewed four or 
five of the images, whereas Holmes had already viewed approximately one hundred images, 
which all contained child pornography. Id. 
 124 Id.; see also Matejka, supra note 11, at 196 (arguing that the virtual certainty test was 
satisfied). 
 125 See Matejka, supra note 11, at 196 (arguing that because Holmes knew that the majority of 
the images in the folder were child pornography, the “virtual certainty” test was satisfied). 
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rightly declined to adopt the closed container approach, instead returning to 
the “virtual certainty” test articulated by the Supreme Court in Jacobsen. 
The Sixth Circuit adopted the correct test of scope, but erred in applying the 
test to the facts of the case.  
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